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In this piece for the CBS blog post series, I thought I would step back and see where we are so far in 
the goal of leaving the EU, and consider some (of the many) issues that will require an urgent fix. 
As Tom Enders, CEO of Airbus muses about the Cabinet Chequers meeting today regarding “white 
smoke, black smoke or no smoke,” being emitted after the meeting, there are now less than 9 
months until Britain formally leaves the EU on 29th March 2019 unless Article 50 is rescinded or the 
negotiating period extended. 
Here we need to draw a distinction between the withdrawal agreement (i.e., that part specifically 
related to the “divorce” from the EU) and the negotiations around our “future relationship” with the 
EU. 
The latter at present is rather nebulous (to say the least), with the Government continuing to insist 
on a “frictionless” (or as “frictionless as possible”) trade deal with the EU, whilst in turn being 
accused by EU negotiators of continued “cherry-picking” and “magical thinking”. 
In public, the EU maintains any withdrawal agreement needs to be agreed by October in order to 
provide time for ratification. The UK Government (particularly David Davis) has challenged this. 
However, in private, EU leaders/officials acknowledge that an agreement by the end of December 
would give sufficient time for ratification. 
This is because, in contrast to some perceptions, ratification of the withdrawal agreement “only” 
requires the consent of the EU Parliament and a qualified majority in the European Council. 
In theory, this could be undertaken rather quickly. However, debate over whether December gives 
sufficient time for ratification is almost an irrelevance at this point: the chances of meeting an 
October deadline are now rapidly diminishing towards zero and December appears optimistic. 
Indications from EU leaders in private are that they would consider extending the Article 50 
negotiating period (to allow loose ends to be tied up and ratification). 
However, this requires the unanimous support of the European Council (and, obviously the UK 
Government). We should also note that any extension on this basis would be for months rather than 
years (an important point in the event that the UK wishes a hard Brexit). 
If we turn to what is needed to get the UK a “transition period” (where we would continue to stay in 
the Single Market and Customs Union after March 29 next year up to December 31st 2020), so as to 
allow more time to cushion the impact of Brexit on businesses, the issues of Northern Ireland, the 
“divorce bill” and the rights of EU citizens living in the UK need to be settled. 
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Of these, Northern Ireland is the most problematic at this point. The UK has agreed that trade 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic should be “frictionless” and is committed to avoiding 
any border infrastructure. 
However, given present technologies, this would require (at a minimum): 
 A rather comprehensive customs agreement (in all probability it would require a fully-
fledged customs union), AND 
 Continued adherence to the regulatory environment of the Single Market in goods (crucially 
including all phytosanitary standards) 
Both these issues appear to be major sticking points at present. 
The EU is prepared to treat Northern Ireland, but not Great Britain as being within the Single Market 
for goods. This implies a divergence between Great Britain and Northern Ireland – a “red line in the 
Irish Sea” – that is unacceptable for Unionists and unpalatable for the UK Government. 
There are enormous tensions within the governing party over whether the UK should remain in a 
customs union with the EU. As such, our judgement is that the UK is likely to have to make 
significant concessions in order to resolve the dilemma in Northern Ireland. 
The situation is now urgent – the EU is making preparations for a “no deal” Brexit next 
year.  Although these will avoid “Armageddon” (their words), the situation will be uncomfortable 
(and grow increasingly uncomfortable) for British businesses seeking to deal with their European 
counterparts. 
The NHS is making preparations to ensure the continued supply of essential drugs. All existing EU 
Free Trade Agreements with third parties will cease to apply to the UK (unless grandfathered) and 
Open Skies agreements will need to be put in place to avoid planes being grounded on 30th March. 
These are all likely to be considerably less favourable than arrangements that the UK currently 
has.  Significant concerns remain over the absence of customs infrastructure (on both sides, but 
particularly in the United Kingdom). 
Failure to agree ongoing membership of EU regulatory bodies (notably around aerospace, chemicals 
and medicines) will cause severe disruption.  For services businesses, “passporting” rights would end 
at 11pm on 29th March 2019 in the event of a “no deal” exit. 
There are also issues around UK hauliers being able to board a ferry or train and drive throughout 
the EU to deliver parts or final goods. 
If we leave the Single Market then we will default to a situation whereby the UK will have a 
maximum of 1224 permits to distribute among those 75,000 vehicles! You can imagine the 
disruption this would cause. 
Finally (for now), leaving the Single Market could also have consequences for digital downloads (e.g., 
Netflix) and broadcasting. Post-Brexit we will default to the European Convention on Transfrontier 
TV, passed in 1989, when the UK only had four TV channels. 
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This could hit British broadcasters who want to make their content available abroad, as the UK is one 
of the largest beneficiaries of the rights conferred in the Digital Single Market, perhaps in part due to 
the popularity of English language broadcasts. 
You can see our excellent blog piece by Jessica Guy and David Hearne on this here. 
In summary, the European Council have agreed that the transition period of de facto continued EU 
membership without voting rights can be agreed and ratified simultaneously with the withdrawal 
agreement, giving an additional 20 months in which to agree and ratify the “future relationship”. 
However, if the future relationship touches any areas of shared competency (and any broad trade 
agreement or EEA membership would), it will need to be ratified by the European Parliament, obtain 
unanimous agreement in the European Council and be ratified by every member state (and 
potentially requires the assent of several sub-national parliaments as well). 
It promises to be an interesting few months going forward, to say the least… 
NB: This post is based on a talk Professor de Ruyter delivered to an Opentext Event at Altitude 360 
on 4th July 2018. 
 
